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ABSTRACT 
The headcount ratio and the aggregate headcount are alternative headcount measures of 
money-metric poverty, of which the first is by far and away the more widely employed index 
in the poverty measurement literature. The two indices can present conflicting judgements on 
poverty in both cross-section and time-series comparisons involving variable populations. 
The headcount ratio, it turns out, can also violate an intuitively appealing ‘vector dominance’ 
requirement in poverty comparisons. The present essay traces some of these difficulties to 
issues in population ethics and principles of social choice. The simple point of the essay is 
that apparently innocuous and widely observed conventions in the measurement of poverty 
are actually compatible with problems of both logical oherence and normative appeal.   
Keywords: population ethics, Constituency Principle, Focus Axiom, social choice theory, 
Pareto Principle, Axioms of Subgroup Unanimity, aggregate headcount, headcount ratio 
RÉSUMÉ 
Les ratios par tête et total sont des mesures monétaires alternatives de la pauvreté, dont le 
premier est de loin l'indice le plus largement utilisé dans la littérature sur la mesure de la 
pauvreté. Les deux indices, impliquant des  variables de populations, peuvent présenter des 
jugements contradictoires sur la pauvreté à la fois en coupe transversale et en comparaisons 
chronologiques. Le taux de pauvreté peut également constituer une violation d'une exigence 
intuitivement attrayante de « vecteur dominance » dans les comparaisons de la pauvreté. Le 
présent essai retrace certaines de ces difficultés relatives aux questions d'éthique liées à la 
population et aux principes de choix social. Le point essentiel de l'essai est que les 
conventions apparemment inoffensives et largement observées dans la mesure de la pauvreté 
sont en fait compatibles avec des problèmes de cohérence à la fois logique et normative. 
 
Mots clés : Éthique des populations, Principe de circonscription, Axiome de concentration, 
Théorie du choix social, principe de Pareto, axiome d’unanimité de sous-groupe 
JEL Classification: D30, D63 
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Four strands of analytical enquiry which stand at the intersection of economics and 
philosophy are the following: 
(i) John Broome’s (1996) ‘Constituency Principle’, which was advanced as a principle that 
ought to guide the ethical comparison of alternative histories of the world. Broome proposed 
the principle as a part of a systematic effort at formally examining some of the problems in 
population ethics that were thrown up by Derek Parfit’s (1984) explorations of the subject in 
his book Reasons and Persons;   
(ii) Kenneth Arrow’s (1963) formulation of a problem in preference aggregation that has 
since come to be known as the General Possibility Theorem. Of particular salience to the 
concerns of this paper is the principle of social choi e known as the Pareto Principle. 
(iii) The relative claims of the numbers and the proportions of people in poverty as 
constituting the appropriate headcount in a reckoning of the magnitude of economic (money-
metric) poverty in a society. Aspects of this problem (or related ones) have been investigated 
by, among others,  Eduardo Arriaga (1970), S. Subramanian (2002, 2005, 2012), Julia 
Paxton (2003), Satya Chakravarty, Ravi Kanbur and Diganta Mukherjee (2006), Nicole 
Hassoun and S. Subramanian (2012), and N. Hassoun (2014), and  
(iv) The possibility that the headcount ratio of poverty could display trends in the parts of the 
whole which are negated by the trend in the whole. This problem could be seen to pertain to 
the larger issue of sub-group aggregation (or subgroup decomposition) of poverty. The 
theme of intra- and inter-sectoral decomposition has been explored by Huppi and Ravallion 
(1991); and the problem is directly addressed in Elayaraja and Aparajay (2014). 
On the face of it, there appears to be no reason why the fields of enquiry outlined above 
should bear any relation to one another. Yet, and as this paper demonstrates, aspects of these 
seemingly disparate lines of investigation actually converge on certain problems in social 
indicators measurement. In what follows, we make an effort to elucidate the links between 
issues (i) and (iii) mentioned in the listing above, and likewise the links between issues (ii) 
and (iv). It turns out that the Constituency Principle in population ethics and the Pareto 
Principle in social choice theory do have implications for certain identifiable problems in the 
measurement of economic poverty.  
 
1. SUGGESTIVE EMPIRICAL EXAMPLES FROM THE MEASUREMENT OF 
POVERTY  
 
1.1 The Aggregate Headcount and the Headcount Ratio: Contradictory Behaviours 
The headcount ratio of poverty is the proportion of a population in poverty (typically, the 
proportion below a threshold level of income identified as the ‘poverty line’), while the 
aggregate headcount is the absolute numbers of the population in poverty. While both 
headcount measures have been employed in the literatur , it is the ratio rather than the 
aggregate which has been overwhelmingly popular in co ceptual and applied work. Of 
interest to the concerns of this paper is the fact tha the two headcount measures can issue 
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contradictory messages when we are engaged in variable population poverty comparisons. 
This can happen with both cross-section and time-seri s comparisons. Tables 1 and 2 furnish 
examples of this phenomenon, and are taken from Subramanian (2005) wherein the problem 
is examined with much greater directness. Table 1 suggests that the poverty rankings of three 
States of the Indian Union in 1987-88 are wholly different for the aggregate headcount and 
the headcount ratio. Table 2 suggests that if we were to rank poverty in the State of West 
Bengal over the years 1973-74, 1977-78 and 1983-84, the ranking according to the 
headcount ratio would precisely invert the ranking according to the aggregate headcount. We 
shall revisit this issue in more abstract terms in Section 2. 
 
Table 1: A Cross-Section Example from Indian Data on Contradictory Rankings of 
Poverty by the Aggregate Headcount and the Headcount Ratio (Orissa, West Bengal, 


















Orissa 17.49 0.579 3 1 
West Bengal 21.05 0.335 2 3 
Tamil Nadu 21.92 0.407 1 2 
 
Source: This table is based on Table 1 of Subramanian (2005), in which data on A and H are from the 
Report of the Expert Group on Estimation of Proportion and Number of the Poor, Planning 
Commission (Government of India), 1993. 
 
Table 2:  A Time-Series Example from Indian Data on Contradictory Rankings of 
Poverty by the Aggregate Headcount and the Headcount Ratio (West Bengal, India: 


















1973-74 25.69 0.545 3 1 
1977-78 26.69 0.520 2 2 
1983 27.78 0.479 1 3 
Source: This table is based on Table 4 of Subramanian (2005), in which data on A and H are from the 
Report of the Expert Group on Estimation of Proportion and Number of the Poor, Planning 
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1.2 Anomalous Behaviour of the Headcount Ratio 
The headcount ratio, as noted earlier, is one of the most elementary and widely-used 
measures of poverty – and, indeed, of various other social indicators of achievement (or 
deprivation), such as (il)literacy, (un)employment, urbanization, and so on. It is just the 
proportion of a population experiencing the particular social outcome whose magnitude we 
are interested in measuring. 
Suppose we were to partition a population into a set of mutually exclusive and completely 
exhaustive subgroups (on the basis, say, of gender or age or caste or race). On the face of it, 
it seems reasonable to require that, given the poverty (or unemployment, etc.) levels of all 
other subgroups, if the poverty (or unemployment, etc.) level of any one subgroup increases, 
then so should the level of aggregate poverty (or unemployment, etc.). It would be 
reasonable, a fortiori, to require that if the poverty levels of all the subgroups should 
increase, then this ought to be reflected in an increase in the aggregate level of poverty.  The 
‘anomalous’ behavior of the headcount ratio, referrd to in the subsection heading, is that the 
ratio does not always satisfy the two requirements just described. An empirical example 
from Indian data on headcount rates of work participation (see also Elayaraja and Aparajay, 
2014), summarized in Tables 3 and 4, verifies this proposition.  
 
Table 3: Headcount Ratios of Work Participation Among Agricultural Main Workers 
by Sector of Origin: India 2001 and 2011 
Year 2001 2011 Direction of 
Change 
Rural Headcount Ratio 71 71  No Change 
Urban Headcount Ratio 6  7 Increase 
Aggregate Headcount 
Ratio 
53 50 Decline 
Source: Calculated from Primary Census Abstract Table, Census of India (2001 and 2011). 
 
Table 4: Headcount Ratios of Work Participation Among Male Agricultural Main 
Workers by Sector of Origin: India 2001 and 2011 
Year 2001 2011 Direction of Change 
Rural Headcount Ratio 68 69 Increase 
Urban Headcount Ratio 5 6 Increase 
Aggregate Headcount 
Ratio 
50 47 Decline 
Source: Calculated from Primary Census Abstract Table, Census of India (2001 and 2011).  
 
For a partitioning of the population into two subgroups (constituted, respectively, by the 
rural and the urban sectors), Tables 3 and 4 provide information on subgroup and aggregate 
headcount ratios of work participation in India (for, respectively, agricultural and male 
agricultural main workers) in the years 2001 and 2011 (The work participation rates are 
presented as the nearest integer approximations). Table 3 indicates that though the headcount 
ratio for the urban sector rises in 2011 vis-à-vis 2001, with the headcount ratio for the rural 
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sector remaining unchanged over this period, the aggregate headcount ratio declines from 
2001 to 2011. Table 4 indicates that despite an increase in both subgroups’ headcount ratios 
from 2001 to 2011, the aggregate headcount ratio acually declines over this period. 
This ‘anomalous behaviour’, on some inspection, stands explained in terms of over-time 
changes in the population weights of the subgroups. Huppi and Ravallion (1991) clearly 
underline the nature of the problem when they advance a procedure for the decomposition of 
a change in the value of a poverty index into a change attributable inherently to changes in 
the values of the subgroup indices, and a change attributable to changes in the subgroup 
population shares. Why the headcount ratio behaves s it does is therefore amenable, on 
some reflection, to fairly easy explanation; but the fact that anomalous behavior can be easily 
explained does not, for that reason, make that behavior non-anomalous. 
The contradictory and anomalous behaviours presented i  the preceding discussion are 
sought to be examined further, in what follows, in terms of some axiomatic principles 
underlying the phenomena under review.  
2. POPULATION ETHICS , THE CONSTITUENCY PRINCIPLE , AND POVERTY 
MEASUREMENT  
 
Derek Parfit (1984, p.381) addressed the ‘awesome question’: ‘how many people should 
there ever be?’  This question is related to the on, raised by Jan Narveson (1967), among 
others, of the moral basis for justifying the creation of an additional life. The ability to 
answer these questions in population ethics may depend on the ability to accurately identify 
whose interests and preferences must be consulted in arriving at an answer. John Broome 
(1996) suggests that the constituency of individuals that must be consulted in addressing 
these questions is the constituency of individuals who exist in all of the histories of the world 
under comparison. In particular, the relevant constituency must exclude people who are no 
longer alive or who are yet to be born in the histor es being evaluated – extinct and potential 
people, in short. This leads to a general principle underlying the welfare comparison of 
alternative states of the world, which Broome calls the Constituency Principle. The principle, 
stated loosely and in a general way, requires that in judging the relative ‘goodness’ of any 
two alternative states of the world, the judgement must depend only on the views of an 
identified relevant constituency whose distinguishing hallmark is that it is members of this 
constituency alone that have a legitimate and justifiable interest in the outcomes of the two 
states of the world under comparison. 
Interestingly, there exists a specific application of the Constituency Principle in the poverty 
measurement literature. This is constituted by what Amartya Sen (1981) called the ‘Focus 
Axiom’. The Focus Axiom reflects the view, as Sen (1981, p. 86) puts it, that ‘…the poverty  
measure  is  a characteristic of the poor, and not of the general poverty of the  nation'. Arising 
from this, Sen postulated, in his Focus Axiom, that increases in the non-poor incomes of a 
society ought not to make any difference to the extnt of measured poverty – since it is the poor, 
and only the poor, who form the constituency that must be consulted in the poverty comparisons 
of alternative states of the world. 
Without enquiring into the substantive merits of the axiom, one may yet ask if those who 
subscribe to the Income Focus Axiom are not also obliged to defer to what one may call a 
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Population Focus Axiom (Hassoun and Subramanian, 2012). The Population Focus Axiom 
requires that, other things equal, additions to the non-poor population ought not to make any 
difference to the extent of measured poverty. The moral reasoning underlying the Population 
Focus Axiom is exactly the same as that underlying the Income Focus Axiom – namely, that the 
only relevant constituency that must be consulted in poverty comparisons of alternative states of 
the world is the constituency of the poor – entailing, therefore, that the magnitude of poverty 
should be invariant with respect to increases in no-p or incomes and non-poor populations 
alike. Subscription to the Income Focus Axiom would therefore appear to warrant subscription, 
in the interests of consistency, to the Population F cus Axiom as well – or, in general, to what 
one may call a Comprehensive Focus Axiom (Subramanian, 2012) which requires that, other 
things equal, if two societies are identical with respect to the distribution of poor incomes, then 
they must be judged to have the same extent of poverty, 
An interesting but little remarked fact is that both the Income Focus Axiom and the headcount 
ratio have been widely accepted as unexceptionable elements of the economics literature on 
poverty measurement. Yet, if Income Focus entails deferral also to Population Focus, then the 
headcount ratio cannot really be seen as an admissible measure of poverty. For note that 
additions to the non-poor population, other things equal, will cause the headcount ratio of 
poverty to decline, which clearly falls foul of the Population Focus Axiom. The aggregate 
headcount, in contrast, always respects the Comprehensive Focus Axiom. 
Of further interest is the fact that coalitional decisiveness as an ingredient in the normative 
aspect of collective decision-making is very much a feature of the principles informing social 
choice theory. In what follows, we briefly review one such principle of social choice – the 
Pareto Principle – and indicate how the headcount ratio could violate an analogous principle that 
could be formulated within the context of poverty comparisons. 
3. THE PARETO PRINCIPLE IN SOCIAL CHOICE THEORY AND POVERTY 
MEASUREMENT  
 
3.1 The Pareto Principle and Analogous Sub-Group Unanimity Principles for Poverty 
Measurement 
Social choice theory, which is concerned with the aggregation of individual preferences over 
alternative states of the world into a collective pr ference, offers at least one example of a 
coalition of individuals to whom it seems natural to accord decisiveness in the collective 
ranking of social states. The example is constituted by the Pareto Principle, due to Vilfredo 
Pareto, and formulated in social choice-theoretic terms by Kenneth Arrow (1963). The 
Pareto Principle simply accords decisiveness in social choice over every pair of alternatives 
to the grand coalition of all individuals constitutng society: it requires respect for unanimity, 
namely that for any pair of social states (x,y), if every person in society prefers x to y, then so 
should society. This is what one may call the W ak Pareto Principle (Sen, 1970). The Strong 
Pareto Principle requires that for any pair of social states x and y, if at least one person 
strongly prefers x to y with the rest of society weakly preferring x to y, society should 
strongly prefer x to y. The Weak and Strong Pareto Principles can be employed as models for 
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what one may call the Weak and Strong Unanimity of Subgroup Poverty Principles in the 
measurement of poverty. To see what is involved, some investment in notation is helpful. 
An income distribution is a vector 1( ,..., ,..., )i nx x x=x , where ( 0)ix ≥ is the income of 
person i in a community of n individuals. N is the set of positive integers, and R the set of 
positive real numbers. For every N∈n ,  nX  is the set of n-dimensional vectors, so that the 
set n n≡ ∪X X  is the set of all conceivable income distributions. The poverty line z is a 
positive level of income such that all persons with incomes less than z are certified to be 
poor. For every Xx ∈ , we shall let )(xq  stand for the number of poor people in x, and n(x) 
for the size of the total population in x. Suppose the population is partitioned into 
)1( nKK ≤≤  mutually exclusive and completely exhaustive subgroups. In everything that 
follows, we shall take both z and K to be given and fixed. We shall let gx  stand for the 
income vector of subgroup g ( ),...,1 Kg = . Any income vector x can also be written 
as ),...,,...,( 1 Kg xxxx = . Given z and K, a poverty measure can be written as a mapping 
R→X:P  such that, for every Xx ∈ , P specifies a real number which is supposed to 
signify the extent of poverty in the distribution x. Two elementary headcount indices are the 
Aggregate Headcount A and the Headcount Ratio H, given, for all Xx ∈ , by, respectively:  
);()( xx qA ≡  and 
).(/)()( xxx nqH ≡  
We can now present a couple of ‘subgroup unanimity’ axioms for poverty comparisons 
which are analogous to the Weak and Strong Pareto Principles in social choice theory (we 
reiterate that, in everything that follows, z and K are taken to be given and fixed, and we 
assume that )2≥K :  
Weak Unanimity of Subgroup Poverty Axiom (Axiom U). For all 
Xyyyyxxxx ∈== ),...,,...,(),,...,...,( 11 KgKg  
if  
},...,1{)()( KgPP gg ∈∀> yx   
then  
).()( yx PP >  
Strong Unanimity of Subgroup Poverty Axiom (Axiom D). For all  
 Xyyyyxxxx ∈== ),...,,...,(),,...,,...,( 11 KgKg   
if  
)()( jj PP yx >   
for some },...,1{ Kj ∈  and  
jgPP gg ≠∀≥ )()( yx  
 then ).()( yx PP >  
That is, Axiom U demands that, given any pair of income distributions x and y, if every 
subgroup in x has more poverty than in y, then x should be judged to have more poverty than 
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y. The strong version of Axiom U, Axiom D, demands that, given any pair of income 
distributions x and y, if at least one subgroup in x has more poverty than in y while the 
remaining subgroups all have at least the same extent of poverty in both distributions, then x 
should be judged to have more poverty than y.  
Axiom D is reminiscent of a property of poverty indices which Foster and Shorrocks (1991) 
have called Subgroup Consistency (Axiom S). Axiom D is in fact a strengthened version of 
Axiom S which demands that, given any pair of income distributions x and y, if at least one 
subgroup in x has more poverty than in y while the remaining subgroups all have the same 
extent of poverty in both distributions and if, additionally, each subgroup has the same 
dimensionality in both distributions, then x should be judged to have more poverty than y. 
Axiom D, that is, drops the requirement of subgroup-dimensional equality in the statement of 
the antecedent of Axiom S.  
 
3.2 Headcount Measures of Poverty and the Subgroup Unanimity Axioms 
In what follows, we consider some elementary results on how the Aggregate Headcount 
measure (A) and the Headcount Ratio measure (H) fare in respect of the two subgroup 
unanimity axioms of poverty we have presented in the preceding subsection.  
Let DP be the set of all poverty indices which satisfy Axiom D, and UP  the set of all 
poverty indices which satisfy Axiom U. Then, the following Claims are true. 
Claim 1.  ;Φ≠
D
P  and, in particular, .
DA P∈  
Proof. Let x and y be two distributions satisfying the antecedents in the statement of Axiom 
D. Let )( gA x  and )( gA y  be the aggregate headcounts for subgroup g in the distributions x 














gAA yy and 
since ,)()(&)()(:},...,1{ jgAAAAKj ggjj ≠∀≥>∈∃ yxyx one must have: 
).()( yx AA >  ■ 
Since Axiom D implies Axiom U, it follows that the aggregate headcount A also satisfies 
Axiom U.  
The headcount ratio, unlike the aggregate headcount, does not fare well with respect to the 
subgroup unanimity axioms, which is the substance of Claim 2. 
Claim 2. .UH P∉  
Proof. A counterexample should suffice. Let the poverty line be z, and let there be two 
subgroups A and B which are mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive. Let x and y be two 
distributions such that ),( BA xxx = and ),( BA yyy = , with the following features:  
;201)(;100)(;;0);,...,;,...,( AA101100A ==∞<<<<= xxx nqxzzxxxxx  
;198)(;99)();,...,;,...,( AA1100A === yyy nqxxxx  
;100)(;1)();,...,;,...,( BB1100B === xxx nqxxxx  
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.103)(;2)();,...,;,...,( BB1100B === yyy nqxxxx  
Then,  
;4975.0201/100)(/)()( AA === Axxx nqH
;5000.0198/99)(/)()( AA === Ayyy nqH ;0100.0100/1)(/)()( BB === BnqH xxx
.0194.0103/2)(/)()( BBB === yyy nqH  
Further, 
;3356.0301/101)(/)()( === xxx nqH    
and  
.3356.0301/101)(/)()( === yyy nqH  
To summarize, and given the values of the various headcount ratios just provided, we have:  
)5000.0)(()4975.0)(( AA =<= yx HH  
and  
),0194.0)(()0100.0)(( BB =<= yx HH  
but  
),3356.0)(()( == yx HH  
in violation of Axiom U. (We could think of A and Bas two countries constituting the world. 
Then y can be seen to have been derived from x by the migration of one poor person and of 
two non-poor persons from A to B. While this raises the headcount ratio in each country, the 
overall headcount ratio for the world remains unchaged, since all that has happened is 
migration from one country to another.)   ■
Since Axiom U is implied by Axiom D, it follows that the headcount ratio also violates 
Axiom D. 
4. CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS  
 
We have argued in this note that there are plausible reasons that can be derived from 
population and preference-aggregation ethics which render the widely-employed headcount 
measure of poverty, the headcount ratio, an unappealing measure. In particular, the 
headcount ratio – unlike the aggregate headcount – violates a version of the Constituency 
Principle in population ethics, and a version of the Pareto Principle in social choice theory. 
This should provide grist to the mill of commentators such as Hassoun (2014), who tend to 
argue against the headcount ratio in favour of the aggregate headcount. There, are, however, 
difficulties with the aggregate headcount as well, which will not be reviewed here (see 
Subramanian, 2005, though). In view of these difficult es, there may be a case for employing 
an ‘intermediate’ headcount measure, one which combines the ratio and the aggregate in a 
‘compromise candidate’ (on which see, for example, Arriaga, 1970; Subramanian, 2005; and 
Population ethics  




Chakravarty, Kanbur and Mukherjee, 2006). Alternatively, there may be a case for 
measuring poverty without going through the usual ‘identification-cum-aggregation’ routine, 
so that no resort is had to any headcount assessment at all: Kaushik Basu’s (2001, 2006) 
‘quintile income statistic’ – or average income of the income-poorest 20 per cent of a 
population – is a possible candidate. These larger issues are beyond the purview of the 
present essay, whose principal concern has been to submit that the widely prevalent practice 
of employing the headcount ratio as an acceptable indicator of poverty must be subjected to 
question. The headcount ratio could well be just one more example of the practice of 
measurement inspired by what Anthony Shorrocks (2005) calls ‘network’ and ‘externality’ 
effects, and Serge-Christophe Kolm (1976) calls considerations of ‘convenience’.   
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